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Malaysia has moved faster than most of Southeast Asia on post-quantum cryptography. A national migration framework arrived in 2024. A readiness roadmap followed in October 2025, a National Cryptography Policy in November 2025, and in July 2026 a National PQC Migration Plan and a quantum cryptography sandbox. In September 2026 an independent regional assessment placed Malaysia alone in the top readiness tier in ASEAN.
The work does not land on the CISO's desk alone. Moving cryptography touches product, infrastructure, procurement, risk and operations, so this guide is written for the whole group: CISOs and heads of cybersecurity, CTOs and technology and product chiefs, chief risk and compliance officers, heads of emerging and quantum technology, and OT leaders. It also covers what the strategy means for universities that want to teach this or open a quantum research lab.
New to the topic? The video Quantum Security Explained is a useful starting point, and it works well for colleagues outside the security team who need the basics before the detail below.
Quick answer: Malaysia's working migration window runs from 2025 to 2030 under NACSA's non-binding plan, which builds on CyberSecurity Malaysia's five-phase framework. That framework starts with a full cryptographic inventory. No legal migration deadline exists yet and no policy requires a CBOM, but critical sectors can be bound through sector codes under the Cyber Security Act 2024. Leaders should build the inventory now, extend it into software, hardware and cryptographic bills of materials, and pilot hybrid cryptography. Universities have a defined opening in the roadmap's human readiness pillar.
Quantum-safe migration has many owners. A practical split looks like this:
The programme has built up in five steps:
The Kuala Lumpur conference drew more than 600 participants from over 30 countries, which made it one of the largest dedicated PQC events anywhere.
Malaysia has a clear start and a working end. It does not have a legal deadline in between.
The framework runs in five phases: Assess (preparation and inventory), Select (algorithm selection and standardisation), Validate (validation and pilot), Deploy (implementation) and Monitor (monitoring and resilience). The document does not say whether it is mandatory or voluntary, so treat it as expected practice until a regulator says otherwise.
The third pillar matters most to universities, and a later section covers it.
The answer has three layers.
The pace of policy is the clearer signal. At the July launch, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim said that a National Cryptography Policy and cryptography action plans "were not things we discussed years ago." Check NACSA's current guidance if you operate in Malaysia, because this position can change quickly.
Three bills of materials answer three different questions. Together they give a CTO, a CRO or a head of cybersecurity an evidence trail for both supply chain and cryptographic risk.
A CBOM complements an SBOM and does not replace it. The CycloneDX 1.6 standard, released in 2024, introduced the CBOM (developed by IBM Research) next to formats for software, hardware, services and AI/ML bills of materials. NIST's NCCoE has a draft practice guide, SP 1800-38B, on cryptographic discovery, and CISA's HBOM working group published a hardware bill of materials framework in 2023.
Where does Malaysia stand? The policy MyKriptografi does not require a CBOM or an inventory. CyberSecurity Malaysia's framework does, in Phase 1, which calls for a detailed inventory of cryptographic assets including protocols and key management systems. It also asks organisations to assess dependencies on third-party vendors, which is where an SBOM and HBOM earn their keep.
The direction elsewhere is clear. India's roadmap calls for mandatory bills of materials in all government RFPs. The Philippines already makes an SBOM mandatory for government software procurement. In the United States, an executive order signed on 22 June 2026 reportedly directs CISA and NIST to publish minimum CBOM elements within 270 days. A company that builds its three bills of materials now will meet most vendor questionnaires before they arrive.
The steps below follow the order in which most national roadmaps, Malaysia's included, ask organisations to work.
To see how a migration programme is framed from the first assessment to the last system, watch Navigating Quantum Safe Migration. It pairs well with the steps above when you brief your own leadership team.
Human readiness is the third pillar of the national roadmap, and it names universities as partners. The surrounding signals point the same way. NACSA has presented a planned Cyber Security and Cryptology Development Centre. A November 2025 PKI Consortium conference deck lists Universiti Putra Malaysia among the partners supporting the national proof-of-concept. MIMOS opened a Quantum Intelligence Center in February 2025 with an aim of building a quantum valley, and the Prime Minister endorsed a National Quantum Policy and a National Quantum Task Force in October 2025.
For a university deciding whether to offer technical courses or to open a Centre of Excellence or quantum research lab, a workable path looks like this:
Check programme approval, funding and accreditation requirements with the relevant Malaysian authorities before launching, because we found no published funding call specific to PQC teaching labs. Institutions exploring industry partnerships can look at QNu Academy as one route.
Both countries start with visibility and both lean on pilots. They differ on binding force, testing and bills of materials.
India's detail was presented at the PQC Migration Workshop at Pragati Q-Foundry 2026 in New Delhi on 30 September 2026. For a business with operations in both markets, the first two steps, inventory and risk classification, are identical.
Both roadmaps begin with one question: where does your cryptography actually live? QShield 2.0 is QNu Labs' sovereign post-quantum platform built around that question. Its Quantum Readiness Risk Assessment module discovers certificates, keys and algorithms across an estate and builds the cryptographic bill of materials, then classifies exposure, ranks migration order and keeps checking as standards change. It can run on-premises or air-gapped, and it is designed so algorithms can change without rebuilding the systems above them.
Watch the QShield 2.0 launch video for a short overview, see how the platform has grown in QShield vs. QShield 2.0.
It is a national framework for transition to post-quantum cryptography, unveiled by the Ministry of Digital and NACSA on 29 October 2025. It has three pillars: technical readiness, strategic alignment and human readiness. It is the first structured national PQC framework published in Southeast Asia.
The national plan runs on a 2025 to 2030 window, building on a 2024 migration framework. No legal deadline has been published, and the 2035 date in the framework is a citation of NSA's CNSA 2.0 timeline.
The roadmap is non-binding. MyKriptografi makes national trusted cryptographic products mandatory for Official Secrets and NCII classified data, and the Cyber Security Act 2024 lets sector leads write cryptographic requirements into sector codes. Check NACSA for updates.
It is a testing environment launched on 9 July 2026 alongside the National PQC Migration Plan. It supports quantum-safe implementations and helps build a national cryptography ecosystem.
A CBOM lists cryptographic assets such as algorithms, keys and certificates. An SBOM lists software components and a HBOM lists hardware components and firmware. Together they show where quantum-vulnerable cryptography sits and what can be patched or must be replaced.
Not in national policy. CyberSecurity Malaysia's migration framework asks in Phase 1 for a detailed inventory of cryptographic assets, which is the same work. Treat it as expected practice.
Several roles share it. The CISO owns inventory and monitoring, the CTO and CTPO own architecture and vendor roadmaps, risk and compliance chiefs own the register and regulatory mapping, and OT leaders own hardware. A single programme lead should coordinate.
Align courses to the five-phase migration framework and the algorithms on Malaysia's trusted list, build inventory and sandbox-style testbed labs, and partner early with NACSA, CyberSecurity Malaysia and industry. Check approval and funding rules with the relevant authorities.
Malaysia is the only ASEAN country in Group 1, the top of five tiers, in the ASEAN PQC Readiness 2026 report published by SITG-Consulting on 1 September 2026.
Both start with inventory and pilots. India has dated sector timelines, mandatory bills of materials in government RFPs, a proposed national testing framework and a PQC plus QKD dual track. Malaysia's roadmap is non-binding and aligns with NIST algorithms.