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Adversaries are collecting encrypted data today so they can read it once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer arrives. On 30 September, at Pragati Q-Foundry 2026 in New Delhi, the Department of Science and Technology, the National Quantum Mission and DSCI ran a PQC Migration Workshop on CBOM, quantum risk assessment and the practitioner’s view. The timeline shown on stage puts the break of RSA-2048 at 2029 on the aggressive view and 2031 on the conservative one. Here are the lessons that matter for CISOs, architects and policy teams, followed by a practical plan.
The global slide made the pattern clear:
Critical systems by 2030 to 2031 and everything by 2035 is the working global benchmark. Two of these national approaches pair PQC with QKD.
The roadmap slide defines a window of quantum risk exposure from 2024 to 2035. NIST released its first PQC standards in 2024. RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, DH and ECDH are slated for deprecation in 2030 and disallowed by 2035. Harvest now, decrypt later means data captured today is already part of the exposure.
The CNSA 2.0 trajectory chart carried the number every programme owner should note. Organisations that have not started a cryptographic inventory by 2026 will miss the 2030 network equipment deadline, because migration typically takes three to five years. It is October 2026.
One chart plotted data shelf life against system life cycle. Insurance, banking and the public sector sit in the quadrant at risk earliest, and the reasons are concrete:
A simple test follows. If the years your data must stay secret, plus the years your migration needs, exceed the years until a quantum attack, you are already late.
The Task Force report on the Quantum Safe Ecosystem, launched on 13 May 2025, sets separate clocks for Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) and enterprises.
Short-term actions also include a National PQC Testing and Certification Program through TEC, STQC and BIS, common PQC procurement guidelines with mandatory bills of materials for all Government RFPs, and a mandate to use indigenous quantum-safe solutions.
The national testing and certification framework proposes a risk-based model with four hierarchical assurance levels and a three-tier national laboratory model. It also provides a common reference for regulators, government, industry and certifiers, plus sector-specific timelines that regulators can enforce. Combined with mandatory bills of materials in Government RFPs, buyers will ask vendors for evidence. Solutions that can be tested and certified will move faster through procurement.
The roadmap calls for large-scale adoption of PQC alongside essential deployment of QKD across a national quantum-secure backbone. The example inter-city design uses PQC nodes at Layer 2 and Layer 3, QKD nodes and key relays, and encryptors running over existing DWDM links. QKD deploys in several forms, including point-to-point links, trusted-node networks, free-space and satellite.
Field evidence is building:
The hardware pipeline is visible. QPiAI has fabricated a 64-qubit superconducting chip, IISc is integrating a 24-qubit photonic computer, RRI is testing a 25-qubit neutral atom system and IISER Pune a 20-qubit trapped ion system. The quantum startups announcement on 26 November 2024 drew about 400 participants, including 200 venture capitalists. The supply chain slide stresses component manufacturing and skilled people, and the summary slide notes that India has a number of players offering indigenously developed quantum-safe products.
Every lesson above ends with the same question. Who can take an organisation from discovery to assessment to assurance without stitching together imported parts?
QNu Labs built its stack for that sequence. QShield 2.0 starts with cryptographic discovery and CBOM, runs a Quantum Readiness Assessment, and adds Quantum PKI, AI Security and an advanced Quantum Vault, all on sovereign technology. Migration then draws on Hodos for PQC, Armos for QKD and Tropos for QRNG, with QHSM and QKMS for hardware security and key management. The hybrid design the national roadmap describes comes from one India-built stack.
Each product carries its own agentic AI layer for automated monitoring, orchestration and operational intelligence. That supports the continuous monitoring and lifecycle governance listed in the long-term actions. Hybrid is the honest answer, and QNu Labs delivers it from first inventory to ongoing assurance.
The dates are set and migration takes three to five years. An inventory is the cheapest first step, and every month without one shortens your runway.
A Cryptographic Bill of Materials lists every algorithm, key, certificate and library across your estate. It is the starting point for risk assessment and migration planning.
The Task Force roadmap starts short-term actions in 2027 for CII and 2028 for enterprises. Long-term milestones fall in 2029 for CII and 2033 for enterprises.
They work at different layers. PQC upgrades existing systems with new algorithms at scale, while QKD uses quantum physics to distribute keys over links. The national roadmap pairs both.
Attackers store encrypted traffic today and decrypt it when quantum capability arrives. Data with a long shelf life is exposed now.
Start with a cryptographic inventory. Every later step depends on knowing what you run and where.